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The UN Women (2015) flagship report, Progress of the World’s Women 2015–2016: 
Transforming economies, realizing rights (hereafter Progress), is an important contribu-
tion to global social policy making. Chapters 2 (on employment) and 3 (on social policy) 
are particularly inspired. More generally, the overarching emphasis that economic and 
social rights need to be conjoined with universalistic approaches to social policy is an 
especially important message. Progress stakes this position at the outset by asserting that 
a ‘comprehensive approach to social policy that combines universal access to social 
services with social protection through contributory and non-contributory transfer sys-
tems is the best way to realize economic and social rights for all without discrimination’ 
(p. 15; also see chapter 3, p. 132). This emphasis is crucial because, otherwise, the human 
rights based approach advocated by the report is sufficiently generic to be unhelpful for 
substantive policy-making.
To clarify this point, human rights based approaches are arguably founded on univer-
salistic principles of social provisioning and social security, as stipulated by Langford 
(2009), and many advocates of rights-based approaches implicitly (and sometimes 
explicitly) evoke a universalistic approach to social policy through their discourse of 
rights (as does Progress). However, in the quest to operationalize these approaches, a 
degree of ambiguity often enters into the translation from ethics to practice. For instance, 
does the principle of non-discrimination imply universalism (i.e. the same treatment for 
all) or targeting? As pointed out by Mkandawire (2005: 5), post-modern and/or feminist 
scholars have criticized universalism along these lines, in that purportedly universalistic 
policies have often reflected fundamental underlying societal biases, such as racial or 
gender biases. In turn, this implies that a degree of selectivity is required in order to 
allow for the practice of positive discrimination.1 Similarly, the principle that pro-
grammes should focus on marginalized, disadvantaged and excluded groups can be 
easily construed as a rationale for targeting, particularly when asserted in the absence of 
any substantive discussion of policy. The emphasis on reducing disparity does not, in 
itself, resolve debates between targeting and universalism given that proponents of tar-
geting have posed it as more equalizing than universalism. The principle that people 
should be recognized as key actors in their own development, rather than as passive 
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recipients of commodities and services, could sit quite comfortably with the logic of 
right-wing political attacks against universalism, which frame welfare as dis-incentiv-
izing people from taking responsibility for themselves. It could also be attributed as a 
rationale for using conditionalities in cash transfers, for labour market activation poli-
cies, or for other behaviourally inspired approaches of disciplining welfare recipients. 
The ethical principles offered by human rights based approaches do not necessarily 
provide a clear path through these very politicized options.
Indeed, many advocates of human rights based approaches for development appear 
to acquiesce to targeting as the de facto status quo, albeit this partly reflects a degree 
of conceptual slippage, referring to the use of targets in development goals rather than 
targeting in social policy.2 Although the potential fragmentation of citizenship rights 
that the latter can entail should be a major bone of contention for human rights advo-
cates, it rarely figures in their analyses, albeit with some exceptions.3 While the 
avoidance of these contentious issues – perhaps by oversight – provides the appear-
ance of politically neutral moral authority in an otherwise thorny field of politicized 
policy-making and ideological disputes, it also misses a valuable opportunity to 
explicitly re-embed human rights into their earlier post-war association with welfare 
states and Keynesian commitments to full employment. Instead, human rights 
approaches risk being subverted as monitoring and disciplinary devices for policy 
agendas that are otherwise quite antithetical to the spirit of universal rights. It is in 
this sense that this edition of Progress makes a vital contribution in clarifying the 
mutually reinforcing interdependence between human rights and universalistic social 
policy, thereby adding to the momentum within the UN towards a consensus around 
this understanding.
However, in a similar respect, some of the more problematic parts of the Report con-
cern chapter 4 on macroeconomic policy. One important omission is the option of corpo-
rate taxation as a means to expand the tax base. More broadly, the chapter does not 
provide a convincing answer to the fundamental question of whether a human rights 
framework can actually provide guidance through the extremely politicized and ideo-
logical field of macroeconomic policy-making and its relation with social policy, or at 
least not without some grounding in substantive policy positions.
On the first point, Progress is conspicuously silent on corporate taxation as an 
option to maximize the resources for substantive equality through mobilizing tax 
revenues, whether by improving efficiency and or widening the tax base (pp. 211–
215). It briefly mentions the dilemma of transfer pricing later in the section under 
global economic governance, acknowledging that this does undermine the maxi-
mum available resources principle of human rights based approaches (see p. 225 
and then the recommendation on p. 228). This acknowledgement of tax avoidance 
appears to implicitly support the Southern-led proposal to establish an intergovern-
mental body within the UN on international cooperation in tax matters in the Third 
International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 
2015 (which was blocked by Northern countries at the conference). However, in this 
light, it is doubly strange why corporate taxation is not mentioned as an option for 
expanding the tax base. As noted by Montes (2015) in a blog following the Addis 
conference, developing countries derive a greater proportion of their tax revenue 
from corporate taxes than developed countries (as much as 50% in some cases), and 
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the negative effects of corporate tax avoidance and evasion are twice as large in 
non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) as in 
OECD countries. Montes contends that the limitations of developing countries to 
collect corporate taxes have translated into higher tax burdens on purely domestic 
enterprises, including on smallholder farmers and small businesses in which women 
disproportionately participate. He also highlights the irony that the lost revenues 
obstruct the ability of states to apply the ‘maximum available resources’ to fulfil 
their human rights obligations, even though many Northern states entered the 
Financing for Development conference stressing the importance of gender equality 
and human rights, while also blocking the developing countries in their attempts to 
address corporate tax avoidance. Notably, subsequent OECD proposals published in 
October 2015 as part of its two-year Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) pro-
ject have also done little to address these Southern concerns. Despite addressing 
this efficiency side of the corporate taxation question via the issue of tax avoidance 
and evasion, Progress nonetheless fails to connect these concerns with the more 
general story about lowering norms for corporate taxation since the 1970s.
On the second point, part of the reason why the chapter is somewhat unconvincing 
is because of a degree of conceptual fuzziness. It clarifies macroeconomic policy as 
monetary and fiscal policy, but then characterizes both as typically focusing on a nar-
row set of goals, such as increasing economic growth rates or reducing price inflation 
to extremely low levels. As such, it argues that these policies are often considered to 
be gender-neutral because they deal with aggregates that typically do not have any 
reference to gender equality, even though they have far-reaching gender implications 
(e.g. see p. 195). Progress then elaborates on three areas where macroeconomic poli-
cies currently constrain progress towards substantive equality: narrow goals and gen-
der biases; insufficient focus on employment creation; and insufficient resources to 
sustainably finance the social policies required to ensure gender equality and positive 
distributional consequences (see pp. 197–198).
These two realms of macroeconomic policy need to be differentiated. The charac-
terization of narrow goals applies to the case of monetary policy, although it should be 
noted that ‘maximum’ employment is one of the three statutory objectives for mone-
tary policy in the US Federal Reserve Act (the US Federal Reserve presumably being 
a model of independent central banking).4 In this respect, the way that full or maxi-
mum employment is conceived has been more a matter of ideology than of goals. The 
same applies to the theoretical blind spots concerning the institutional conditions that 
allow the fullness of employment to influence wages and inflation, such as the bargain-
ing power of labour. Notably, the weakening of labour bargaining power explains 
much of the stagnation of wages in most OECD countries since the 1970s. Indeed, 
recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) research by Jaumotte and Osorio Buitron 
(2015) has also recognized the relation between labour bargaining power and inequal-
ity, as measured by the decline in the share of workers affiliated with trade unions and 
the fall in the minimum wage relative to the median income, both of which are signifi-
cantly associated with rising inequality. One hopes that central bankers of the world 
unite in reconsidering, based on these and other findings, the classical assumptions 
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about labour demand and wages that underlie their assessments of ‘natural’ rates of 
unemployment.
However, the characterization of fiscal policy as sharing similarly narrow goals as 
monetary policy appears to be a conflation of these two policy realms. Fiscal policy 
in the aggregate is an important variable of economic activity and its constraints are 
also generally conceived in the aggregate. However, unlike monetary policy, fiscal 
policy necessarily deals with a wide range of policy realms, as a function of the 
financing of various government ministries by the finance ministry (or treasury). 
Social policy has always played a prominent role in fiscal policy if only because it 
constitutes among the largest categories of government expenditure, in rich as well 
as in poor countries. For example, government expenditure on education is particu-
larly large in most countries. It has also long been understood that the redistributive 
potential of fiscal expenditures depends on how these expenditures are used, particu-
larly in social policy, and, inversely, that the redistributive potential of social policy 
needs to be conceived relative to the broader fiscal context of taxation and 
spending.5
While the challenge with monetary policy is to make implicit politics explicit, it is 
precisely the overtly political character of fiscal policy and its deep immersion into the 
intimate spheres of social politics that renders it so prone to ideological contestation. If 
fiscal policy proves to be gender-biased, it is probably more a matter of the gender biases 
that pervade such politics, rather than a lack of references to gender equality in aggregate 
fiscal goals as such. The challenge of a human rights framework is to provide guidance 
through these politics, particularly in settings where changes to existing fiscal and social 
policy systems involve deeply embedded power relations and vested interests employing 
seductive ideologies about the best ways to address the generic concerns raised by a 
human rights framework. This is particularly vital when certain ideological positions 
have been closely associated with devastating consequences for development and, by 
consequence, for human rights.
A good example is provided by the recent mainstream revival of concerns about 
inequality. As argued in Fischer (2012), simply naming the problem of inequality 
does not solve the intractable policy debates about how to deal with it. For instance, 
in the midst of the UN-led consultation on inequalities in 2012 and well before the 
frenzy surrounding Piketty (2014), The Economist (2012) acknowledged the potential 
dangers of inequality. However, it placed the brunt of the blame on state-owned enter-
prises and monopolies in China, oligarchs in Russia and India, market-obstructing 
labour unions everywhere, and ‘misdirected welfare spending’ in rich countries. The 
last point refers to social spending on the non-poor, although the editors appear to 
conflate (or commit a rhetorical sleight of hand) between social assistance and more 
general social spending, such that we are led to presume that general public provision-
ing in education and healthcare amounts to welfare spending. This ‘biggest target for 
reform’ should be addressed through raising retirement ages, means-testing public 
spending, and using some of the saved cash for education in a market-reformed and 
union-free school system. This is combined with the usual policy advocacy for further 
liberalizations and market reforms related to competition and transparency (particu-
larly with respect to emerging economies). As such, the editors provide a diagnosis 
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and cure for inequality that perpetuates the neoliberal condemnation of government 
policy and planning as the principal source of problems, and of inequality as emerg-
ing from market distortions, even though the policy agendas associated with this per-
spective have arguably been at the heart of rising inequalities since the 1970s in the 
first place.
Similar narratives have abounded in the mainstream literature with varying hues of 
nuance. The Economist simply provides – as it usually does on most current issues – one 
particularly seductive narrative for relatively easy erudite public consumption. 
Nonetheless, similar ideational undertones pervade relatively more moderate positions. 
For instance, the recent World Development Report 2013: Jobs (World Bank, 
2012: p. 257) similarly advises labour market deregulation and targeted social protection 
among a range of other liberalizations and amidst a setting of macroeconomic stability. 
Gender concerns enter occasionally, such as under the proposals for targeting the invest-
ment climate, which should tackle market imperfections or government failures that pre-
vent women’s labour force participation. It is clear that these policy positions have not 
fallen far from the neoliberal tree, insofar as inequalities, discrimination and disadvan-
tage are conceived in terms of market obstructions.
The predicament for human rights approaches is that the advocates of these policy 
paradigms claim to address the concerns raised by human rights. Indeed, Hayek and his 
progenies have long argued that there is a harmony between the economic freedoms 
promoted by neoliberalism and the civil and political freedoms classically championed 
by human rights; the contemporary expression of this position is perhaps best repre-
sented by Easterly (2013). Hence, in the absence of policy specifications beyond generic 
principles, many come to fill the void, more or less reproducing the spectrum of politi-
cal and ideological policy positions. While it might be argued that the attractiveness of 
human rights is that they transcend these messy ideological policy disputes by imposing 
ethical standards to which all policy paradigms must conform, in effect they do not 
resolve these disputes. Rather, the de-politicization that is usually entailed in the pro-
cess of generating a consensus on generic principles — or goals, such as with the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
– runs the risk of giving an upper hand to the more dominant orthodox positions within 
the spectrum of these debates, particularly given the emphasis of targeting within these 
principles.6
Even in situations where there is a motivation to move social policy in more univer-
salistic directions, and where there are resources to fund this, social policy reforms are 
usually entangled with the parallel politics of fiscal reform. A good example is in 
China, where the necessity of social policy reform has been recognized by the govern-
ment since the 1990s given the sharp segregation of rural and urban residents, particu-
larly in a context of rapid urbanization where such designations have long become 
antiquated. A major challenge of such reform, however, is tied up with reforming the 
regional fiscal system given that most of the spending responsibilities related to social 
policy are assigned to sub-central levels of government (e.g. provinces and below), 
even though it is generally agreed that their share of tax revenues, combined with cen-
trally coordinated transfer payments, have been insufficient to cover these assigned 
responsibilities.7 The insufficiency has impelled these lower levels of government to 
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rely on various forms of non-tax revenue generation, such as land transfer fees and 
other administrative fees, even though these have been regressive forms of revenue 
mobilization and have been quite controversial in human rights terms given their reli-
ance on land appropriation.8 Borrowing restrictions on sub-central levels of govern-
ment have also been partly circumscribed by the practice of using local state-owned 
investment vehicles to borrow from local state-controlled financial institutions, par-
ticularly following the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, although this has rein-
forced the reliance on land appropriation as a model for both local development and 
local government financing. The central government has been attempting to address 
these issues through fiscal reform, which is understood as vital for reforming and 
expanding the social security and health insurance systems.9 Nonetheless, the increas-
ing fiscal imbalances highlight the increasingly crucial role of centrally coordinated 
transfer payments in balancing the regional fiscal system, particularly since 2007, and 
also in advancing social policy reforms. The politics of this has also been very sensi-
tive given that the increasing reliance on regional subsidies has come under criticism, 
particularly in coastal surplus provinces, due to the perception that it encourages 
dependence, particularly in ethnic minority western provinces.10
More specifically with respect to health care in China, different views and vested 
interests compete on the question of how to reform, each with different fiscal implica-
tions. For instance, Lin (2012: 430) analyses how, in the policy debates leading up to the 
comprehensive health system reforms in China in 2009, different fiscal options were 
lobbied by different ministries: the Ministry of Finance favoured demand-side financ-
ing such as health insurance, with an idea of the need for consumer choice; the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Security favoured a single social protection system under its man-
agement; and the Ministry of Civil Affairs preferred the Medical Assistance scheme as 
a cash benefit. Even though it was weaker within this ministerial hierarchy, the Ministry 
of Health was left to argue for supply-side controls over health costs through budget 
subsidies to providers (and thereby curtailing the practice of public hospitals and pro-
viders effectively operating as private providers), as essential for dealing with issues of 
equity and access (Lin, 2012: 430). The close connection to fiscal policy again needs 
highlighting: as argued by Lin, a particularly important structural factor derailing 
reforms in the 1990s and 2000s was, as discussed above, the decentralized public 
administration and paucity of intergovernmental financial transfers since the economic 
reforms of the 1980s, which gave little clout to the central government over provincial 
and municipal governments, hospitals and doctors, in contrast to pharmaceutical com-
panies that exerted power at all levels (Lin, 2012: 431). In other words, progressive 
reforms in the health system in China have been predicated on the reinvigoration of 
substantial regional fiscal redistribution and a strong central government role in coordi-
nating this redistribution.
Progress does actually address many of these points in chapter 3 on social policy, 
such as the importance of supply-side factors in social provisioning and in cautioning 
against a single-minded obsession with demand-side cash transfers. However, the 
strength of that chapter, in creating strong links between human rights and substantive 
social policy positions, does not carry over as effectively into chapter 4, where the policy 
recommendations are overly generic. The challenge with the human rights framework 
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provided remains how to derive substantive guidance through complex and politicized 
fiscal policy processes, without specifying more precisely the fiscal policy modalities 
that are best aligned with supporting a universalistic social policy agenda. For the devel-
oping countries, this would include an activist use of fiscal policy, not simply for demand 
management but also for funding the deep structural transformations required for devel-
opment, in the absence of which the gender implications are generally quite dire. 
However, perhaps this was intentionally left for the reader to divine from the otherwise 
very rich text, precisely because of the politics of pushing too far against orthodoxy 
within the UN itself.
Notes
 1. In response to these criticisms, Mkandawire (2005: 5–6) notes that the most gender-progres-
sive policies are found in societies where universalism is also an integral part of social poli-
cies. He also advocates targeting within universalism (re. Skocpol, 1991) as a means to adapt 
to difference and diversity. It should be noted that there is a huge difference between targeting 
within a universalistic system versus targeting within a residualist system. For further discus-
sion, see Fischer (2012).
 2. For instance, Langford (2010) refers to targeting in the sense of MDG targets.
 3. Exceptions include Langford (2009), who considers some of these dimensions in his engage-
ment with notions of trade-offs as typically presented in welfare (i.e. neoclassical) economics. 
However, this dimension of social policy is entirely absent from the review of various criti-
cisms of rights-based approaches by Gready (2008).
 4. For example, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12848.htm
 5. For instance, see Korpi and Palme (1998), Rothstein (2001), and Mkandawire (2005).
 6. See Fischer (2010, 2013) for a further elaboration of this argument, also with respect to the 
MDGs and the exclusive focus on absolute money-metric poverty measures, which carry 
similar biases.
 7. For example, see Brys et al. (2013).
 8. On this last point, also see Wong (2010, 2013) and Shen et al. (2012).
 9. See a discussion of this in Wong (2010, 2013).
10. For further discussion, see Fischer (2015).
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